12/28/2023 0 Comments Dr. jing li hku![]() Zhe Yang, PhD (2014-2018), Postdoc/RA (2018-202 1), & Research Assistant Professor (2021-2023)Ĭurrent Position: ARC DECRA Fellow, School of Chemical Engineering/Dow Centre for Sustainable Engineering Innovation, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australiaĭr. Ying Mei, PhD (2015-2019), Postdoc/RA (2019)Ĭurrent Position: Associate Professor, Beijing Normal University (Zhuhai)ĭr. Lu Elfa Peng, PhD (2017-2021), Postdoc/RA (2021-2022), RGC Postdoc Fellow (2023- )Ĭurrent Position: RGC Postdoc Fellow, The University of Hong Kongĭr. Li Wang, PhD (2019-2023,The University of Hong Kong & Southern University of Science and Technology)Ĭurrent Position: Postdoc Fellow, Southern Marine Science and Engineering Guangdong Laboratoryĭr. Li Long, PhD (2019-2023), Postdoc(2 023- )Ĭurrent Position: Postdoc Fellow, The University of Hong Kongĭr. Our results provide a cautionary note to promoting more competition and more disclosure.Dr. Moreover, “hardened” information can reduce the gains to trade, decreasing welfare but increasing shareholders’ payoff. Perhaps surprisingly, stronger competition from the uninformed bidder can reduce the target shareholders’ payoff and increase the payoff of the informed bidder while unambiguously improving social welfare. In turn, an endogenous dis- closure cost arises that induces the informed bidder to optimally withhold favorable information to minimize the acquisition price-breaking down the standard unraveling result, even if his information is always hard. We show that withholding information creates a winner’s curse, thereby serving as a preemption device that deters the rival’s participation. The informed bidder’s information is either hard or soft, and only hard information can be credibly disclosed. We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better information about the target value than a rival and target shareholders. Novel empirical predictions about investment and earnings forecast emerge. When the manager’s concerns about the general ability assessment are relatively large, he is better off by committing to no forecast. The latter is because the signaling incentive to decrease investment is strengthened. When the manager issues an earnings forecast as an additional signaling device, the forecast is upwardly biased, and the equilibrium investment is smaller than that without a forecast. In the presence of underinvestment (overinvestment), higher-quality earnings information reduces (improves) equilibrium efficiency. The concerns about the general (project-related) ability assessment create a signaling incentive to decrease (increase) investment. When investing in a project, he has private knowledge of his project-related ability that interacts with the project investment, and his general ability that produces a cash flow independent of the project cash flow. “Government Assisted Earnings Management in China” (with Xiao Chen and Chi-Wen Jevons Lee), Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 27 (2008), 262-274.Ĭareer Concerns, Investment, and Management ForecastsĪ firm manager is concerned about both the firm value and the market assessments of his abilities.“Earnings Dispersion and Aggregate Stock Returns” (with Bjorn Jorgensen and Gil Sadka), Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53 (2012), 1-20.“Accounting Conservatism and Debt Contracts: Efficient Liquidation and Covenant Renegotiation”, Contemporary Accounting Research, 30 (2013), 1082-1098.“Accounting for Banks, Capital Regulation and Risk-taking”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 74 (2017), 102-121.“Corporate Governance Roles of Information Quality and Corporate Takeovers” (with Lin Nan and Ran Zhao), Review of Accounting Studies, 23 (2018), 1207-1240.“Strategic Nondisclosure in Takeovers” (with Tingjun Liu and Ran Zhao), The Accounting Review, 97 (2022), 345-370.“Selective Disclosure, Expertise Acquisition and Price Informativeness” (with Bjorn N.“Career Concerns, Investment, and Management Forecasts” (with Tae Wook Kim and Suil Pae), The Accounting Review, 98 (2023), 337-363.“Accounting Information and Risk Shifting with Asymmetrically Informed Creditors” (with Tim Baldenius and Mingcherng Deng), Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming. ![]() Edward K Y Chen Distinguished Lecture Series.
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